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Abstract 
This paper reviews the main features of the banking and financial sector in ten new EU 
members, and then examines the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth in these countries by estimating a dynamic panel model over the period 1994-2007.  The 
evidence suggests that the stock and credit markets are still underdeveloped in these economies, 
and that their contribution to economic growth is limited owing to a lack of financial depth. By 
contrast, a more efficient banking sector is found to have accelerated growth. Furthermore, 
Granger causality test indicate that causality runs from financial development to economic 
growth, but not in the opposite direction. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between financial development and economic growth has been extensively 
analysed in the literature.  Most empirical studies conclude that the former, together with a more 
efficient banking system, accelerates the latter (Levine, 1997, 2005; Wachtel, 2001). Levine 
(2005) suggests that financial institutions and markets can foster economic growth through 
several channels, i.e. by (i) easing the exchange of goods and services through the provision of 
payment services, (ii) mobilising and pooling savings from a large number of investors, (iii) 
acquiring and processing information about enterprises and possible investment projects, thus 
allocating savings to their most productive use, (iv) monitoring investment and carrying out 
corporate governance, and (v) diversifying, increasing liquidity and reducing intertemporal risk. 
Each of these functions can influence saving and investment decisions and hence economic 
growth.  Since many market frictions exist and laws, regulations, and policies differ markedly 
across economies and over time, improvements along any single dimension may have different 
implications for resource allocation and welfare depending on other frictions in the economy. 
 
The reform of the financial sector in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) started from the banking 
sector. Its transformation has been one of the most important aspects of the transition process 
from a centrally planned to a market economy. Initially a heavily regulated industry, the banking 
system has been rapidly turned into one of the most dynamic sectors of the economy. The 
process started in the early 1990s when foreign banks began investing in the region.  From 2004, 
these have been holding majority shares in all CEE countries. Their entry into the market has 
resulted in considerable benefits for the sector and the economy in general, but they have had to 
face various challenges deriving mostly from the underdevelopment of key institutional support 
for banking growth. 
 
Although accession to the European Union (EU) has helped the reform process in the CEE 
countries, real convergence in terms of real GDP per capita remains a challenge. The present 
study investigates whether financial development can be instrumental in reducing the gap vis-à-
vis the other EU members. Specifically, after reviewing the main features of the banking and 
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financial sectors in these countries, it examines the empirical linkages between financial 
development and economic growth by estimating a Barro–type growth regression augmented 
with the inclusion of financial variables using panel data for ten transition countries over period 
1994-2007. As financial development varies considerably across these countries, we split them 
into three more homogenous groups: Central and Eastern European countries (CEE-5), Baltic 
countries (B-3) and Southeastern European countries (SEE-2). We also consider the determinants 
of credit, given its importance for financing investment projects and its impact on economic 
growth. We analyse these issues by employing the system GMM method to control for 
endogeneity and measurement errors and obtain unbiased, consistent and efficient estimates. 
Finally, Granger causality tests are carried out. 
 
The layout of the paper is the following. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on the 
relationship between finance and growth. Section 3 analyses the evolution of the financial and 
banking sector in ten transition economies. Section 4 discusses the data and the econometric 
approach, as well as the panel evidence on the nexus between financial development and 
economic growth. Section 5 carries out bi-directional causality tests between financial 
development/efficiency of the banking system and economic growth. Section 6 offers some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The relationship between financial development and economic growth is a controversial issue. 
Some authors consider finance an important element of growth (Schumpeter, 1934; Goldsmith, 
1969; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; King and Levine (1993), whilst for others it is only a minor 
growth factor (Robinson, 1952; Lucas, 1988). Schumpeter (1934) sees the banking sector as an 
engine of economic growth through its funding of productive investment. On the contrary, Lucas 
(1988) argues that the role of finance has been overstressed. 
 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) model the dynamic interactions between finance and growth  
and emphasise the two-way causality between them. Financial intermediaries produce better 
information and improve resource allocation. An expanded system of financial intermediation is 
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able to allocate more capital to efficient investments and thus to foster economic growth. 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) highlight the fact that, by eliminating liquidity risk, banks can 
raise economic growth. Financial intermediaries boost productivity, capital accumulation and 
growth by improving corporate governance. 
 
Existing studies typically focus on variables capturing the size, activity or efficiency of specific 
financial institutions or markets. Early contributions used aggregate data on banks for a large 
number of developed and developing countries including the ratio to GDP of monetary variables 
(M2 or M3), or financial depth indicators (credit to the private sector). Later studies on the link 
between financial development and economic growth have added indicators of the size and 
liquidity of stock markets, but these are available for fewer countries and shorter time periods. 
The same applies to indicators of the efficiency and competitiveness of financial institutions. 
Single-country studies allow researchers to use more extensive micro-based data and/or analyse 
specific policy measures or reforms. 
 
Goldsmith’s paper (1969) was the first to show empirically the existence of a positive 
relationship between financial development and GDP per capita. King and Levine (1993) used 
mostly monetary indicators and measures of the size and relative importance of banking 
institutions and also found a positive and significant relationship between several financial 
development indicators and GDP per capita growth. Levine and Zervos (1996) included 
measures of stock market development and found a positive partial correlation between both 
stock market and banking development and GDP per capita growth. More precisely, they 
reported a positive and significant link between liquidity of stock markets and economic growth, 
but no robust relationship between the size of stock markets and economic growth. Levine et al. 
(2000) found that the development of financial intermediation affects growth positively, and that 
cross-countries differences in legal and accounting system largely account for different degrees 
of financial development. More recently, some authors have suggested that there is a positive 
relationship between financial deepening and per capita income in the transition economies 
(Égert et al., 2007; Backé et al., 2007). A positive effect of financial development on economic 
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growth through its sources (capital accumulation and productivity), and even on income 
inequality and poverty, has also been reported (de Haas, 2001; Levine, 2005).  
 
Only a few studies have focused on the transition economies from Central and Eastern Europe 
(Bonin and Wachtel 2003, Bonin et al., 2005; Hermes and Lensink, 2000; Berglöf and Bolton, 
2002; Haas, 2001; Fink et al., 2005, 2008; Kenourgios  and Samitas (2007), mostly finding a 
positive relationship between several financial indicators and economic growth. Hermes and 
Lensink (2000) provide an overview of the main relevant issues, in particular the role of stock 
markets in the process of financial intermediation (with an emphasis on the importance of 
regulation in these markets), and the role of deposit insurance to improve stability of the banking 
sector. Berglöf and Bolton (2002) find that the link between financial development and economic 
growth does not appear to be very strong during the first decade of transition, at least when one 
looks at the ratio of domestic credit to GDP.  Kenourgios  and Samitas (2007) examined the 
long-run relationship between finance and economic growth for Poland and concluded that credit 
to the private sector has been one of the main driving forces of long-run growth. Hagmayr et al. 
(2007) investigated the finance-growth nexus in four emerging economies of Southeastern 
Europe for the period 1995-2005 and found a positive and significant effect of bond markets and 
the capital stock on growth.  
Fink et al. (2005), using a sample of 33 countries (11 transition economies and 22 market 
economies), found that financial development  has positive growth effects in the short run rather 
that in the long run. Fink et al. (2008) investigated the impact of the credit, bond and stock 
segments in nine EU-accession countries over the early transition years (1996–2000) and 
compared these to mature market economies and to countries at an intermediate stage. They 
found that the transmission mechanisms differ, and that financial market segments with links to 
the public sector (but not to stock markets) contributed to stability and growth in the transition 
economies. Winkler (2009) reviews the process of rapid financial deepening and the associated 
vulnerability and risks for the Southeastern European countries. He argues that the strategy of 
pursuing financial development through the entry of foreign banks does not guarantee financial 
stability. Finally, a strong consensus has emerged in the last decade that well-functioning 
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financial intermediaries have a significant impact on economic growth (Bonin and Watchel, 
2003).  
3. The Banking and Financial Sector in the Transition Economies 
In the centrally planned economies, money played only a limited role as a medium of exchange. 
In the banking sector, the central bank combined the standard functions of monetary authorities 
with some of those of a commercial bank. Besides, in most economies there were banks 
specialising in different sectors, namely export trade operations, financing of long-term 
investment, and the agriculture and food industry. At the time, there was only a state savings 
bank collecting available resources and household deposits. Thus, banking activities were 
characterised by segmentation along functional lines. The transactions within the state sector, 
including those between state-owned production enterprises, involved no monetary payment 
while households used cash for transactions. 
 
The first step in the transition process for the financial sector was the development of market-
oriented financial institutions, banks being the most visible and often the dominant ones. The 
transition to a market economy started in the CEE countries in 1991 with reforms of the banking 
sector. In all transition countries, the first step was the abolition of the mono-bank system. New 
banking legislation was introduced allowing private banks to develop and foreign financial 
institutions to enter the domestic banking sector. Banks were allowed to operate as universal 
trade banks, whilst the new Central Bank remained in charge of monetary policy, including 
exchange rate policy, and monitoring of the newly created banking sector. The new system was 
very similar to that already existing in EU.  Thus, most transition countries experienced a rapid 
expansion of the banking sector due to the entry of new (foreign) banks and the decline in state 
ownership. 
 
The transition generated macroeconomic turbulence and made any new bank lending extremely 
risky. During the 1990s, the increase in stocks of non-performing loans led to banking crises in 
many transition countries. The stock of bad loans evolved partly as a result of the gradual  
recognition of the quality of existing relationships in state-owned banks (the stock issue), and 
partly because of continuing bad lending practices (the flow problem) (Bonin and Wachtel, 
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2003). The privatisation of the state-owned banks and the participation of foreign strategic 
investors in banking represented effective ways to solve these problems.  Thus, progress in the 
banking sector in CEE countries has led to a smaller amount of non-performing loans.  
 
Foreign banks have played an important role in the development of the financial system of the 
CEE countries by increasing credit availability, technology transfers and competition. They have 
been more innovative in terms of the number and range of new products offered, some of them 
already available in the foreign banks’ home markets. Besides, they have helped consolidate the 
CEE’s banking systems, producing waves of mergers and acquisitions that have decreased the 
number of banks. The majority of banks in the newly privatised banking sector are in fact foreign 
–owned. 
 
Financial indicators of the development of the banking sector in several transition economies are 
shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  Main financial indicators of banking sector development 
 Number of  
total banks 
Number of 
foreign 
owned banks 
Asset share 
of state 
owned banks 
(%) 
Asset share 
of foreign 
owned banks 
(%) 
             Year 
Country 
1996 2007 1996 2007 1996 2007 1996 2007 
Bulgaria 49 29 3 21 82.2 21.0 29.3 82.3 
Czech.Rep 53 37 3 15 69.9 2.4 19.0 84.8 
Estonia 15 15 4 13 6.6 0.0 1.6 98.7 
Hungary 42 40 26 27 15.3 3.7 46.2 64.2 
Latvia 34 25 18 14 6.9 4.2 51.5 63.8 
Lithuania 12 14 3 6 54.0 0.0 28 91.7 
Poland 81 64 28 54 51.6 19.5 16 75.5 
Romania 31 31 10 26 80.9 5.7 10.7 87.3 
Slovakia 29 26 14 15 54.2 1.0 12.7 99 
Slovenia 36 27 4 11 40.7 14.4 5.3 28.8 
             Source : EBRD  
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As can be seen, the majority of banks have been privatised and foreign banks hold the largest 
share of assets. This has increased sharply in the past decade in all transition countries, while the 
level of state ownership has fallen below 20 % in each country.  Thus, the influence of the state-
owned banks has declined substantially.  In 2007, no state-owned bank existed any longer in 
Estonia and Lithuania. The entry of foreign banks into the local market had a positive influence 
by increasing competition and efficiency of the banking system, encouraging better regulation of 
the financial sector in the form of banking supervision, and enhancing access to international 
capital. In addition, the higher efficiency of foreign banks has stimulated economic growth, and 
the participation of foreign strategic investors in banking is an effective way to avoid bad loans. 
  
Almost all transition countries have experienced a decline in the number of banks. For example, 
in Bulgaria this has fallen from 49 in 1996 to 29 in 2007. Many smaller banks became insolvent 
owing to stricter regulations for banking supervision. An exception is Lithuania, where the 
number of banks increased from 12 in 1996 to 14 in 2007.  
 
3.1 Liquid Liabilities 
The ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP is an indicator of the size of the financial sector. The highest 
monetisation ratios are found in Slovenia (74.4% in 2007). Romania has recorded a decline in 
this ratio (from 46% in 1991 to 36% in 2007) and has now the lowest one. Generally, the ratio of 
broad money to GDP is at least 60% in high-income countries with developed banking sectors. 
Thus, the banking sectors in the transition economies cannot be considered to be highly 
developed with a few exceptions. 
 
 
 
3.2 Private sector lending growth 
Most transition countries have recorded high private sector lending growth in recent years. This 
expansion of credit has been a feature of the transition countries, foreign banks being the main 
source of credit for the private sector (see Table 2). 
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Table 2.  The evolution of the ratio of private sector credit to GDP (in percent) 
Year  
Country 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Bulgaria 12.5 14.8 19.4 26.7 35.2 42.9 47.1 66.8 
Czech.Rep 44.0 33.0 29.4 30.7 31.6 35.8 40.0 41.0 
Estonia 23.3 24.3 26.0 30.7 39.7 57.0 78.2 89.3 
Hungary 29.9 30.9 33.6 41.0 44.6 49.8 54.1 59.2 
Latvia 21.5  26.3  29.5 40.2 50.8 68.2 87.5 93.9 
Lithuania 11.3 13.5 16.2 22.9 28.8 41.3 50.6 61.2 
Poland 26.9 28.0 28.2 29.2 27.5 29.2 33.4 35.2 
Romania 7.2 8.7 10.1 13.7 15.7 20.0 26.1 32.9 
Slovakia 43.7 33.0 30.8 31.6 30.1 34.7 38.6 42.3 
Slovenia 36.7 38.8 38.6 41.3 48.1 56.4 65.9 79.0 
                    Source: EBRD 
 
Empirical studies suggest a positive relationship between credit to the private sector and per 
capita income in the transition economies (Cottarelli et al., 2005). However, the banking system 
in the CEE countries appears to be more and more dependent on the activities of foreign banks. 
These, mainly from the EU countries, control the majority of assets and capital flows in the 
financial markets. Their entry has indeed boosted economic growth, enhanced competition and 
contributed to attract foreign direct investment. However, the lack of effective anti-trust 
legislation and mergers and acquisitions can lead to excessive concentration, while anti-
competitive practices and abuse of dominant position may also occur. In most CEE countries the 
financial architecture has converged towards a bank-based system with substantial foreign 
ownership. 
  
3.3 Household lending growth 
Another feature of the transition economies was the rapid growth of consumer credit resulting 
from an increase of public confidence in the banking sector as well as in per capita income. 
Currently, the main business in the banking sector is indeed consumer credit (including credit 
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cards and mortgage loans). Its growth also reflects the anticipation of higher future income and 
“consumption smoothing”. However, this contributes to widening current account deficits 
through increased demand for imported consumer goods and currency appreciation. One of the 
reasons for the boom in consumer lending is the relative unattractiveness of wholesale lending 
owing to institutional weaknesses, above all the poor functioning of the legal system. Table 3 
gives some information about the evolution of household lending growth. 
 
Table 3 Evolution of credit to households in percent of GDP 
Year  
Country 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Bulgaria 2.1 2.8 3.7 7.1 10.0 14.4 16.6 23.0 
Czech.Rep 5.6 5.9 7.3 9.1 11.2 13.8 16.5 20.0 
Estonia 7.1 8.4 10.6 14.3 19.7 28.1 38.2 43.3 
Hungary 3.2 4.7 7.4 10.9 12.8 15.6 18.5 21.7 
Latvia 3.3 4.6 7.3 11.6 17.6 26.8 38.0 42.7 
Lithuania 1.3 1.5 2.4 4.2 7.1 12.0 17.9 24.4 
Poland 7.5 8.7 9.4 10.3 10.6 12.4 15.6 20.0 
Romania 1.2 1.7 1.9 3.8 4.8 7.2 11.2 17.7 
Slovakia 4.7 5.1 5.5 7.0 8.6 11.2 13.1 16.3 
Slovenia 11.3 10.9 10.5 10.8 12.2 14.8 17.0 19.2 
                        Source: EBRD 
 
Widening current account imbalances are a concern for policy-makers, and measures might be 
necessary to slow down the growth in credit to households and to allocate more resources to 
productive investments. At the same time, the financial infrastructure should be improved as 
creditors need protection through the enforcement of bankruptcy and insolvency legislation 
meeting international standards. In addition, improving corporate governance and providing 
better credit information might help banks channel resources towards the productive corporate 
sector. 
 
10 
 
3.4 Stock market capitalisation  
The market capitalisation ratio measures the size of the stock market and is equal to the value of 
listed domestic shares divided by GDP. Stock market capitalisation in the transition countries 
grew due to the privatisation process. However, the development of the stock market   was 
affected by the economic and financial crisis that the transition economies have experienced. At 
the end of 2007, these countries still displayed different levels of stock market development, its 
capitalisation ranging from 8.6 % to 57.2 % in the countries covered in this study, being at its 
lowest in Slovakia and at its highest in Slovenia (see Table 4) . 
 
Table 4 Evolution of stock market capitalisation in percent of GDP 
                Year 
Country 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 
Bulgaria 4.8 3.7 4.2 7.9 10.4 19.7 31.1 51.3 
Czech.Rep 18.9 14.1 19.4 17.6 24.5 31.6 31.6 37.4 
Estonia 31.5 24.1 29.9 38.4 47.1 25.2 34.6 26.9 
Hungary 25.1 18.7 17.2 18.3 25 31.6 33.8 32.4 
Latvia 7.3 8.4 7.3 9.5 11.5 16.5 12.9 10.8 
Lithuania 13.9 9.9 9.3 16.9 26.1 31.7 32.6 24.7 
Poland 17.4 13.2 13.6 16.5 23 31.1 40.9 44.1 
Romania 3.4 5.8 10.1 9.2 13.9 22.2 24.4 27.3 
Slovakia 6.3 7.4 6.8 7.4 9.4 9.4 8.8 8.6 
Slovenia 16.8 16.8 24.1 22.5 26.2 22 37.2 57.2 
                          Source: EBRD 
 
Despite an upward trend, the figures still remain below the corresponding ones for the EU 
developed economies. Capital market development is complicated by the need to support the 
development of institutional infrastructure and regulatory mechanisms. Overall, there has been 
significant progress in the banking sector, as also indicated by the EBRD index of banking sector 
reform (see Table A2 in the Appendix).  
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4. Financial Development and Economic Growth: Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we analyse the linkages between financial development/efficiency and economic 
growth using panel data for ten transition countries during the period 1994-2007. First, we 
estimate the impact of financial indicators over the whole sample. Second, we split the data into 
subpanels corresponding to three more homogenous groups of countries and compare the results. 
 
4.1 The Model 
To study the relationship between finance and growth we estimate an augmented Barro-growth 
regression including financial development variables which takes the following form: 
 
[ ] titiitiiiti NGSETCONDITIONIFINANCEGROWTH ,,,, ][ εγβα +++=   (1) 
 or 
                                 tiitiitiiitititi Cfyyg ,,,1,,, εμγβα ++++=−= −    (2) 
 
where y is real GDP per capita, gi,t its growth rate,  fi,t  an indicator of financial development, Ci,t 
a set of conditioning variables, μi and εi,t error terms, i (where i = 1,2…,.N) the observational 
unit (country), and t (where t =1,2,…,T) the time period, while ε is a white noise error with zero 
mean, and μ a country-specific component of the error term that does not necessarily have a zero 
mean.  The parameter αi is the country-specific intercept which may vary across countries.  
 
One important issue concerning the link between financial sector development and growth is the 
difficulty to identify proxies for measuring them. Beck et al. (2000, 2008) discuss different 
indicators of financial development capturing the size, activity and efficiency of the financial 
sector, institutions or markets. In our analysis, we consider several indicators, namely: the ratio 
of credit to the private sector to GDP as a measure of financial depth; indicators of the size of 
stock markets as stock market capitalisation (as a percentage of GDP); monetisation variables 
such as the ratio of broad money  to GDP as a measure of the size of the financial sector; 
indicators of the efficiency and competitiveness of the financial system such as the margin 
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between lending and deposit interest rates and the EBRD transition index of financial 
institutional development. Details are provided below. 
 
Activity of the financial sector: 
- The ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP (DCPS), which is the value of loans 
made by banks to private enterprises and households divided by GDP, is used as a 
measure of financial depth and banking development. This indicator isolates credit 
issued by banks, as opposed to credit issued by the central bank, and credit to 
enterprises, as opposed to credit issued to governments (Levine and Zervos, 1996). 
 
Size of the financial sector  
- The stock market capitalisation to GDP ratio (STMC), which is an indicator of the 
size of the financial sector given by the market value of listed shares divided by GDP. 
Although large markets do not necessarily function effectively and taxes may distort 
incentives to list on the exchange, the market capitalisation ratio is frequently used as 
an indicator of market development. 
 
- Liquid liabilities to GDP ratio (LLG), which equals liquid liabilities of the financial 
system divided by GDP. It is used as a measure of "financial depth" and thus of the 
overall size of the financial intermediation sector (King and Levine,1993a).  
 
Efficiency of the financial sector 
- The interest rate margin (INT), which measures the difference between deposit and 
lending rates in the banking market is used to measure the efficiency of the sector.  
 
Levine (1997) suggested several possible indicators for economic growth: real per capita GDP 
growth, average per capita capital stock growth and productivity growth. Here we use real per 
capita GDP growth. Other variables influencing economic growth were introduced in our model, 
including per capita income, average education, political and stability indicators as well as 
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indicators reflecting trade, fiscal and monetary policy such as government consumption or trade 
openness and inflation.  
 
In the estimation we used real GDP per capita with a one-year lag as initial income per capita to 
control for the steady-state convergence predicted by the neoclassical growth model. For human 
capital, we introduced a proxy for educational attainment, more precisely the secondary school 
enrollment ratio whose expected influence on growth is positive through its effect on 
productivity. International trade openness is proxied by an international trade policy variable, i.e. 
the trade to GDP ratio, with an expected positive coefficient. Higher openness enhances growth 
through higher competition and technological progress (see Winter, 2004). Inflation measures 
the degree of uncertainty about the future market environment, firms becoming more reluctant to 
make long-run commitments in the presence of higher price variability; the expected sign of this 
variable is therefore negative.1  
 
The estimated model, which includes a proxy for financial development, is the following: 
 
tiitititititi
titititititiiti
uINTRILLGSTMCDCPS
HCGVEINFLTOPINVRGDPCRGDPC
,,11,10,9,8,7
,6,5,4,3,21,1,
εβββββ
ββββββα
+++++++
+++++++= −  (3) 
 
where: RGDPC = real per capita GDP growth; RGDPC = initial income per capita; INV = 
investment/GDP (percentage); TOP = trade/GDP (percentage); INFL = inflation, average 
consumer prices; GVE =  government expenditure/GDP; HC = secondary  school enrollment 
ratio; DCPS = domestic credit to the private sector (as a percentage of GDP); STMC = stock 
market capitalisation (as a percentage of GDP);  LLG =  liquid liabilities (as a percentage of 
GDP); RI = Reform index of financial institutional development (which is the average of  the 
EBRD’s indices of banking sector reform and of reform of non-bank financial institutions); INT 
= interest rate margin. 
                                                            
1  Other studies on the finance-growth nexus for the transition economies including inflation as a conditioning 
variable are Rousseau and Wachtel, 2002; Gillman and Harris, 2004. 
 
14 
 
 
 
4.2 Data 
Our panel consists of data for ten transition countries from Central and Eastern Europe over the 
period 1994-2007. The data are annual and the countries included in the sample are:  Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
We also carry out the analysis for three more homogeneous sub-groupings: (a) the Baltic 
countries (B-3): Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; (b) the CEE-5: the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia; (c) Southeastern Europe (SEE-2): Bulgaria and Romania. The 
data were obtained from the EBRD database and the International Monetary Fund (IFS). For 
more details on data sources and definitions, see the Appendix.  
 
4.3 Methodology 
The most common methods for investigating the finance-growth nexus are cross-country 
regressions and panel data techniques. Note that the estimates of βi (financial development 
indicators) can be biased for a variety of reasons, among them measurement error, reverse 
causation and omitted variable bias. Therefore, a suitable estimation method should be used in 
order to obtain unbiased, consistent and efficient estimates of this coefficient. To deal with these 
biases, researchers have utilised dynamic panel regressions with lagged values of the explanatory 
endogenous variables as instruments (see Beck et al., 2000; Rioja and Valev, 2004). Such 
methods have several advantages over cross-sectional instrumental variable regressions. In 
particular, they control for endogeneity and measurement error not only of the financial 
development variables, but also of other explanatory variables. Note also that, in the case of 
cross-section regressions, the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term if it is 
not instrumented (see Beck, 2008). 
 
The dynamic panel regression takes the following form: 
 
titititititiiti yCCfg ,1,
2
,2
1
,1,, ελμδγγβα +++++++= −             (4) 
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where C1 represents a set of exogenous explanatory variables, C2 a set of endogenous explanatory 
variables, and λ a vector of time dummies.  
 
In our analysis, we employ the system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995), 
which combines a regression in differences with one in levels. Blundell and Bond (1998) present 
Monte Carlo evidence that the inclusion of the level regression in the estimation reduces the 
potential bias in finite samples and the asymptotic inaccuracy associated with the difference 
estimator. 
 
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the instruments used in the 
model as well as the assumption that the error term does not exhibit serial correlation. In our 
case, the instruments are chosen from the lagged endogenous and explanatory variables.  In order 
to test the validity of the selected instruments, we perform the Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). In addition, we also check for the presence 
of any residual autocorrelation. Finally, we perform stationarity tests belonging to the first- 
(Levin-Lin-Chu, 2002) and second-generation unit root test (Pesaran, 2007), (see the Appendix 
for details). The results suggest that all series are stationary (see Table A5 in the Appendix), and 
consequently no co-integration analysis is necessary. Therefore we proceed directly to the GMM 
estimation.   
 
4.4 The estimation results 
The dynamic panel regressions were run both for the ten transition economies as a whole and the 
three subgroupings mentioned before. The estimation results are presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
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Table 5: The financial development and economic growth nexus: dynamic panel regression 
(1) (2)  
Variables RGDPC RGDPC 
0.229 0.201 L.RGDPC 
(3.40)*** (4.62)*** 
0.292 0.342 INV  
(4.50)*** (5.50)*** 
0.015 0.011 TOP  
(2.21)** (2.33)** 
-0.008 -0.006 INFL  
(3.59)*** (4.01)*** 
-0.057 -0.066 GVE  
(2.56)** (5.66)*** 
0.018 0.020 HC 
(3.61)*** (3.61)*** 
 0.007 DCPS  
 (0.23) 
 0.004 STMC 
 (2.95)*** 
 0.013 LLG 
 (2.42)** 
 0.493 RI  
 (1.82)* 
 -0.027 INT 
 (5.64)*** 
0.070 -0.059 Constant 
(2.84)*** (0.58) 
Observations 140 140 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  -0.17   0.15 
Prob > z (0.867) (0.878) 
Sargan test chi2 27.45 30.94   
Prob > chi2    (0.237) (0.156) 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The first regression represents a standard growth equation with the GDP per capita growth rate 
as an endogenous variable. The results suggest that capital accumulation, i.e. investment, is the 
most relevant determinant of the growth process. As expected, human capital and trade openness 
have a positive and significant impact on economic growth, the former through improved 
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productivity, and the latter (resulting from the signing of regional agreements) through higher 
competition and technological progress.  
 
To analyse the link between financial sector development and economic growth we added to the 
standard growth regression (1) three financial indicators, i.e. the ratio to GDP of private credit, 
liquid liabilities and stock market capitalisation respectively. We find that credit to the private 
sector has a positive but insignificant effect on economic growth, possibly as a result of the 
numerous banking crises caused by the large proportion of non-performing loans (and thus 
unsustainable credit growth) at the beginning of the transition process in the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Tang et al., 2000). However, credit granted to private companies is essential 
for financing investment projects, which in turn affect positively long-run growth. 
 
Further, the stock market capitalisation to GDP ratio has a positive but minor effect on economic 
growth. Despite an upward trend for this indicator in the CEE countries during the period being 
investigated, their stock markets still have a small size, and it is therefore very important to 
attract foreign investors. The ratio of liquid liabilities as a proportion of real GDP has a positive 
and significant coefficient, consistently with the idea that money supply helps growth by 
facilitating economic activity. 
 
As the size of the financial sector by itself might not be sufficient to estimate the role of financial 
development in the growth process, we added to the model two indicators of financial efficiency: 
the interest margin rates between the lending and deposit as a measure of efficiency in the 
banking sector, and the EBRD index of institutional development which measures the progress in 
reforming the financial sector. The former variable measures transaction costs within the sector 
but may also reflect an improvement in the quality of borrowers in the economy. If the margin 
declines due to a decrease in transaction costs, the share of saving going to investment increases 
and economic growth accelerates. Both these variables appear to be highly significant (see 
column (3) of Table 5). The margin between lending and deposit interest rates is negatively 
correlated with economic growth, consistently with theory (see Harrison et al., 1999). This 
means that a shrinking interest margin rate can increase economic growth. In all transition 
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countries from Central and Eastern Europe efficiency increased over time but reached different 
levels (see Appendix), depending on the privatisation methods and the influence of more 
efficient foreign banks (see Matousek and Taci, 2005; Bonin et al., 2005). The other financial 
efficiency indicator, i.e. the EBRD index, has a positive effect, implying that reforms in the 
banking and financial sector such as market regulation and monitoring, increase economic 
growth.  
 
The results for the three subgroups are reported in Table 6. The private credit to GDP ratio is 
found to have a positive but insignificant effect in all three groups. As for stock market 
capitalisation, this has a positive, small effect in the case of the CEE-5 countries, and a still 
positive but insignificant one in the SEE-2 and B-3 countries. In the former group the stock 
market expanded more rapidly due to early privatisation and the entry of foreign investors, but it 
is still relatively underdeveloped.   
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Table 6: The financial sector and economic growth nexus in the tree subgroups: 
dynamic panel regression 
CEE-5 B-3 SEE-2 
(1) (2) (3) 
Subgroup 
                          
Variables RGDPC RGDPC RGDPC 
0.236 0.045 -0.083 L1.RGDPC 
(2.69)*** (0.33) (0.65) 
0.181 0.032 0.089 INV  
(5.85)*** (1.70)* (6.99)*** 
0.025 0.221 0.023 TOP  
(3.31)*** (3.96)*** (0.47) 
-0.004 -0.003 -0.016 INFL  
(1.84)* (1.67)* (2.70)*** 
-0.023 -0.034 -0.237 GVE  
(1.86)* (0.68) (3.30)*** 
0.022 0.142 0.078 HC 
(2.42)** (2.97)*** (1.74)* 
0.042 0.014 0.058 DCPS  
(1.70) (0.79) (1.05) 
0.010 0.015 0.002 STMC 
(2.61)** (0.68) (1.31) 
0.008 0.006 0.002 LLG 
(2.10)** (2.44)** (1.81)* 
1.046 0.634 0.311 RI  
(4.74)*** (2.62)** (2.17)** 
-0.031 -0.011 -0.067 INT 
(2.85)** (2.33)** (4.89)*** 
0.098 -0.252 0.267 Constant 
(2.31)** (1.20) (1.50) 
Observations 70 42 28 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  -0.57  0.15 -1.30 
Prob > z (0.570) (0.878) (0.193) 
Sargan test chi2 10.45 30.94   7.65 
Prob > chi2    (0.235) (0.156) (0.364) 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The index of financial institutional development also has a positive effect in all three groups, 
especially so in the CEE-5, followed by the B-3 and the SEE-2, reforms of the financial system 
being more advanced in the two former groups. Monetisation is also significantly and positively 
correlated with real per capita GDP growth in all three cases. In most high-income countries with 
developed banking sectors, the ratio of broad money to GDP is at least 60 percent (Bonin and 
Wachtel, 2003). In the transition countries, the highest monetisation ratio in 2007 is found in 
Slovenia  (75.4), and the lowest in Romania (36.6). The degree of monetisation can be seen as an 
indicator of macroeconomic stability, which represents an incentive for foreign investors. 
 
The efficiency of the banking sector has an important role in economic growth. This indicator is 
negatively correlated with economic growth in all cases.  Achieving higher efficiency remains a 
challenge for these three groups of countries. The CEE-5 have recorded an increase of this 
indicator due to the early privatisation of the banking sector and the entry of foreign banks. The 
SEE-2 countries instead have started privatisation later and seen high interest rate margins during 
the transition period (for example, 20.8 in Romania in 2000 in comparison with 7.2 in Poland 
and 2.1 in Hungary). Overall, underdevelopment of the stock and credit markets, and therefore 
lack of financial depth, remains one of the main features of these countries compared with the 
other EU countries (see Coricelli and Masten, 2004).  
 
4.5 The role of credit in the economy and its determinants 
Lending to the private sector is one of the main driving forces of economic growth. Thus, 
increasing the supply of loans is a key challenge for the CEE countries. Although credit markets 
are still underdeveloped, in recent years in most of these countries the credit to GDP ratio has 
risen. At the end of 2007, these countries displayed a heterogeneous private sector credit to GDP 
ratio ranging from 33% to 94%, the lowest increase being recorded in Romania and the highest 
in Latvia.  This credit expansion has been largely the result of increased mortgage loans to 
households. Rapid credit growth partly reflects the very low initial level of intermediation and 
the convergence towards the levels of the developed EU countries, but the figures still remain 
below those for the euro area (Égert et al., 2007).  Some studies have addressed the question 
whether lending growth has become excessive in the CEE countries (see Boissay et al., 2007; 
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Brzoza-Brzezina 2005; Backé et al, 2007).  Given the importance of credit for economic growth, 
next we investigate econometrically its determinants. Specifically, we expand the model 
proposed by Égert et al. (2007) by adding three new variables, namely: non-performing loans (as 
a percentage of total loans), asset share of foreign-owned banks (in per cent) and domestic credit 
to households (as a percentage of GDP): 
 
DCPS = f( GDPC, BCPS, INFL, INT, HCR, LR, IBR, NPL, PCFB)   (5) 
 
where DCPS is ratio of private sector credit to GDP, and the explanatory variables include: GDP 
per capita at purchasing power parity (GDPC), bank credit to the public sector  as a percentage of 
GDP (BCPS), producer price inflation (INFL), the margin between lending and deposit interest 
rates (INT), domestic credit to households as a percentage of GDP (HCR), nominal interest rates 
(lending rates) (LR),  an index of banking reform (IBR), non-performing loans (as a percentage 
of total loans) (NPL), asset share of foreign-owned banks (in percentage) (PCFB). 
 
The empirical specification is the following: 
 
tiitititi
titititititiiti
uBCPSPCFBNPLIBR
LRHCRINTINFLGDPCDCPSDCPS
,10,9,8,7
,6,5,4,3,21,1,
εββββ
ββββββα
++++++
+++++++= −
(6) 
  
Again, the model is estimated first for the whole panel and then for the subgroups using the 
system GMM method, and the sample period is the same as before. The estimation results are 
reported in Table 7. 
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Table 7: The determinants of credit to the private sector: dynamic panel regression 
TOTAL CEE-5 B-3 SEE-2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
                        ZONE 
 
Variables DCPS DCPS DCPS DCPS 
0.730 0.728 0.737 0.563 L.DCPS 
(14.17)*** (16.31)*** (9.29)*** (3.13)*** 
0.187 0.114 0.216 0.079 GDPC  
(2.13)** (1.86)* (1.96)* (2.10)** 
-0.084 -0.018 -0.028 -0.119 INFL 
(3.29)*** (1.93)* (1.76)* (2.15)** 
-0.023 -0.053 -0.034 -0.293 INT 
(1.74)* (1.66)* (1.88)* (2.45)*** 
0.129 0.029 0.167 0.274 HCR  
(4.07)*** (3.33)*** (3.83)*** (2.47)** 
-0.108 -0.057 -0.098 -0.172 LR  
(1.94)* (1.86)* (1.70)* (2.57)*** 
0.717 0.781 0.953 0.526 IBR  
(3.04)*** (1.88)* (3.44)*** (1.76)* 
-0.046 -0.139 -0.034 -0.121 NPL  
(2.07)** (4.55)*** (2.11)** (1.77)* 
0.041 0.033 0.028 0.073 PCFB  
(2.25)* (2.44)* (3.45)*** (1.51) 
-0.160 -0.121 -0.093 -0.143 BCPS 
(2.32)** (1.92)* (1.84)* (2.25)** 
-0.045 0.589 1.667 0.234 Constant 
(0.14) (1.62) (3.64)*** (0.06) 
Observations 140 70 42 28 
Number of country 10 5 3 2 
Arellano-Bond AR(2)  -1.28 1.25 -0.62   -1.21 
Prob > z (0.199) (0.212) (0.535) (0.227) 
Sargan test chi2 23.67 23.88 16.79 16.51 
Prob > chi2    (0.699) (0.123) (0.819) (0.790) 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
We note that GDP per capita has a positive effect on private credit, increasing financial depth. 
Higher disposable income, as well as low foreign interest rates, made it easier for households to 
finance their expenditure and service their debt. Private credit growth has been largely the result 
of more loans to households, primarily mortgage-based housing loans (see the Appendix).  
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The lending rate is negatively linked to private credit. Thus, a decrease in lending rates, i.e. in the 
cost of borrowing, leads to financial deepening. Inflation also has a negative effect, leading to 
macroeconomics instability.  Credit is instead positively affected by the asset share of foreign-
owned banks. These have become increasingly important for the expansion of domestic credit in 
these countries. Moreover, in the CEE countries the financial sectors are dominated by private 
banks where foreign banks (mainly from the EU) hold the largest share of assets.  As expected, 
non-performing loans have a negative effect, as their growth leads to banking crises and 
therefore slower credit growth. By contrast, the index of banking reform has a positive effect, 
confirming that reforms to the banking system stimulate credit growth and the development of 
credit markets. Credit to the public sector has a negative effect. The margin between lending and 
deposit interest rates also has a negative effect, a more efficient banking sector leading to 
financial deepening.  
 
Heterogeneity in credit dynamics can have various causes, such as a different degree of 
economic development and of financial intermediation, and different institutional and regulatory 
frameworks. The factors that are normally found to stimulate credit growth in the transition 
countries, such as an increase in income or a decrease in lending rates, inflation and non-
performing loans, continue to play an important role in the case of the CEE countries.  Progress 
in their economic and monetary integration can accelerate credit growth, with benefits in terms 
of financial and economic development, but also with potential risks: a credit boom can have 
negative repercussions such as sizeable external imbalances, for instance consumption and 
investment booms leading to economic overheating and banking and currency crises.  
  
 
5. Financial development and economic growth: the causal linkages 
 
In this section we investigate causality between financial development and economic growth in 
the ten new EU members included in our panel using Granger-type causality tests. 
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5.1 Granger causality test 
As mentioned above, our series are stationary and therefore it is legitimate to perform standard 
Granger Causality tests. Consider two stationary variables X and Y observed over T periods and 
N units. Let xi,t , (yi,t)  denote the variable X (Y) associated  with unit i = 1,2 .... N and t = 1,2, .... 
T. We test the hypothesis of no causality using the following linear models:  
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with  *NJ ∈  and εi,t i.i.d. ),0( ,iεσ                    
 
5. 2 Results 
We investigate causality linkages in both directions by estimating equations (7) and (8) to test for 
causality in both directions for the following pairs of variables in turn: (i) economic growth 
(RGDPC) and financial development (proxied by domestic credit to the private sector – DCPS); 
(ii) economic growth (RGDPC) and banking efficiency (INT), and finally (iii) economic growth 
(RGDPC) and stock market capitalisation (STMC). 
The Granger causality test was originally designed for time series (Granger, 1969). However, it 
has recently been extended to panels (see Granger and Lin, 1995, Granger, 2003). The estimation 
is carried out here using the system GMM method developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) which was designed to overcome some of the limitations of the 
difference GMM. We perform the Sargan/Hansen test for the validity of the additional moment 
restrictions required by the system GMM estimator. In order to avoid model misspecification 
three conditions should be satisfied: a significant AR(1) serial correlation, lack of AR(2) serial 
correlation and a high Sargan test statistic (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
 
25 
 
In the AR(2) model (J=2) described in Eq. (7, 8) the joint null β1=β2=0 is interpreted as a panel 
data test for Granger causality and is distributed as a χ2 with two degrees of freedom (see Casu 
and Girardone, 2009). A p-value < 0.10 implies a rejection at the 10% significance level of the 
null hypothesis of no causality. 
 
To establish if there is a long-run linkage between xi,t and yi,t, we test the restriction β1+β2=0, 
where the null is “no long-run effect”. The sign of the causal relationship is given by T=β1+β2.  
Table 8: Type of causal relationship and interpretation 
Equation T=β1+β2 Type of 
causal 
relationship 
Interpretation 
Eq. 7 >0 positive An increase of xi,t implies an increase of yi,t  and vice-versa
Eq. 8 >0 positive An increase of yi,t  implies an increase of xi,t and vice-versa
Eq. 7 <0 negative An increase of xi,t implies an decrease of yi,t and vice-versa 
Eq. 8 <0 negative An increase of yi,t implies an decrease of xi,t and vice-versa 
 
A positive (negative) T implies that the causal relationship between past xi,t and present yi,t  (eq. 
7) or between past yi,t and present xi,t  (eq. 8) is also positive (negative).  
 
The results of the Granger Causality test are reported in Tables 9a and 9b. 
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Table 9a: Granger Causality test between domestic private credit sector   
and economic growth  
Variables 
 
RGDPC Variables DCPS 
0.670 1.022 L1.RGDPC 
(3.49)*** 
L1.DCPS 
(2.31)** 
-0.147 -0.431 L2.RGDPC 
(0.69) 
L2.DCPS 
(2.23)* 
0.010 9.520 L1.DCPS 
(0.50) 
L1.RGDPC 
(1.82) 
0.027 -0.478 L2.DCPS 
(1.28) 
L2.RGDPC 
(0.23) 
-0.010 0.345 Constant 
(0.47) 
Constant 
(0.66) 
L1.DCPS + L2. DCPS 0.037 L1.RGDPC  + L2.RGDPC 8.042 
Granger  causality p-value (0.017) Granger  causality p-value (0.120) 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) p-value 
0.127 Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) p-value 
0.211 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) p-value 
0.412 Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) p-value 
0.155 
Sargan test of overid. 
restrictions: p-value 
0.752 Sargan test of overid. 
restrictions: p-value 
0.998 
Test (β1 + β2)=0 Prob>F 0.325 Test (β1 + β2)=0 0.206 
Observations 140 Observations 140 
Number of country 10 Number of country 10 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
One can see that the relationship between private credit and economic growth is positive but the 
estimated coefficients are not statistically significant, leading to the conclusion that there are no 
causal linkages between these two variables. Also, there is no Granger causality in either 
direction between economic growth and financial depth (DCPS). 
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Table 9b: Granger Causality test between interest rate margin   
and economic growth  
Variables 
 
RGDPC Variables INT 
0.646 -0.010 L.RGDPC 
(8.73)*** 
L1.INT 
(0.10) 
-0.146 0.274 L2.RGDPC 
(3.09)** 
L2.INT 
(3.21)** 
0.001 7.157 L1.INT 
(1.96)* 
L.RGDPC 
(1.96)* 
-0.003 -17.938 L2.INT 
(2.17)** 
L2.RGDPC 
(4.29)*** 
0.019 1.382 Constant 
(4.90)*** 
Constant 
(3.99)*** 
L1.INT+ L2.INT -0.002 L.RGDPC + L2.RGDPC -10.781 
Granger causality p-value (0.035) Granger causality p-value (0.13) 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) p-value 
0.151 Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) p-value 
0.250 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) 
0.658 Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2 p-value)  
0.579 
Sargan test of overid. 
restrictions: p-value 
0.852 Sargan test of overid. 
restrictions: p-value 
0.901 
Test (β1 + β2)=0 0.300 Test (β1 + β2)=0 0.101 
Observations 140 Observations 140 
Number of country 10 Number of country 10 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Further, causality runs from banking efficiency (INT) to economic growth but not in the opposite 
direction, i.e. the interest rate margin Granger-causes economic growth. This linkage is negative 
and significant. Again, there is no evidence of long-run effects of causality from INT to RGDPC 
(Prob>F = 0.300 , implying that  “H0: no long-run effect” is not rejected).   
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Table 9c: Granger Causality test between stock market capitalisation and economic growth  
Variable 
 
RGDPC Variable STMC 
0.652 0.373 L1.RGDPC 
(8.33)*** 
L1.STMC 
(2.14)* 
-0.092 0.133 L2.RGDPC 
(1.37) 
L2.STMC 
(1.35) 
0.007 -1.206 L1.STMC 
(3.44)*** 
L1.RGDPC 
(0.24) 
-0.005 5.439 L2.STMC 
(2.64)*** 
L2.RGDPC 
(2.64)** 
0.012 0.494 Constant 
(5.54)*** 
Constant 
(1.94)* 
L1.STMC + L2.STMC 0.002 L1.RGDPC + L2.RGDPC 4.233 
Granger  causality p-value 0.002 Granger  causality p-value 0.176 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)  
p-value 
0.13 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 
 p-value 
0.151 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 
p-value 
0.349 Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)  
p-value 
0.421 
Sargan test of overid. 
restrictions: p-value 
0.625 Sargan test of overid. 
restrictions: p-value 
0.836 
Test (β1 + β2)=0 Prob>F 0.350 Test (β1 + β2)=0 Prob>F 0.451 
Observations 132 Observations 132 
Number of country 10 Number of country 10 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Finally, Granger causality runs from stock market capitalisation (STMC) to economic growth 
(RGDPC) but not in the opposite direction. There is also no evidence of long-run effects (Prob>F 
= 0.350, implying that “H0: no long-run effect” is not rejected).  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have reviewed the main features of the banking and financial sector in ten new 
EU members, and then investigated the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth in these economies by estimating a dynamic panel data model over the period 
1994-2007. To summarise, financial depth is found to be lacking in all ten countries, and 
therefore the contribution of the relatively underdeveloped credit and stock markets to growth 
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has been rather limited, with only a minor positive effect of some indicators of financial 
development. This might be a consequence of the large stock of non-performing loans and the 
banking crises experienced by these economies at the beginning of the transition period. In 
general, the CEE-5 have more developed financial sectors than the B-3 and SEE-2 countries. By 
contrast, the implementation of reforms, the entry of foreign banks and the privatisation of state-
owned banks have reduced transaction costs and increased credit availability. This has improved 
the efficiency of the banking sector (Fries et al., 2006), which has played an important role as an 
engine of growth. Better regulation and supervision was partly motivated by the European 
integration process and the need to adopt EU standards. Thus, many of the banking sector 
weaknesses traditionally characterising emerging markets have gradually been eliminated. Given 
the prospect of EU accession, foreign banks, mainly from the euro area, seized the opportunity 
and established subsidiaries in all CEE countries, seeing them as an extension of the common 
European market and becoming dominant players in their banking sectors. 
 
However, the massive presence of foreign banks has also increased contagion risks, and the 
consolidation process (with the majority of banks being foreign–owned) could limit competition. 
Thus, a financial crisis produced in the mature markets of the euro area could also reach the CEE 
countries. A strategy of financial development based on foreign entry from the anchor currency 
area is no guarantee for a smooth process of finance and growth, an example being the current 
crisis which started in the mature economies in the summer of 2007 and caused a sudden stop of 
capital flows to Southeastern Europe (Winkler, 2009). 
 
Granger causality test suggest that causality runs from financial development, measured as credit 
to the private sector and the interest rate margin, to economic growth, but not in the opposite 
direction. Credit to the private sector has risen rapidly in these countries in recent years but at a 
different rate, the lending boom being particularly strong in the segment of loans to households, 
primarily mortgage-based housing loans. The heterogeneity in credit dynamics can have various 
causes, such as a different degree of economic or financial intermediation development, and 
different institutional and regulatory frameworks. Our analysis of the determinants of credit to 
the private sector highlights different factors that stimulate credit growth in the transition 
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countries, such as an increase in income or a decrease in lending rates, inflation and non-
performing loans, and the implementation of reforms in the banking sector. Further, the high 
growth of credit to households can affect negatively the current account, which might be a 
serious problem for the transition economies.  
 
Overall, the underdevelopment of stock and credit markets, with the consequent lack of financial 
depth, remains one of the main features of these economies. However, elements of market-
oriented intermediation are now the rule rather than the exception throughout them (Bonin and 
Wachtel, 2003), and appropriate policies can reduce financial sector instability that could impair 
growth (Kraft, 2005).The adoption of the euro could have a further positive impact on financial 
development and economic growth in these countries, but this issue is beyond the scope of the 
present paper. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A1: List of variables 
VARIABLE (series) 
CODE NOM 
Source 
BCPS Bank credit to the public sector  as a percentage of 
GDP 
IFS database 
DCPS Domestic credit to private sector (in per cent of GDP) EBRD database 
GDPC GDP per capita (in PPP) EBRD database 
GVE General government expenditure to GDP EBRD database 
HC Secondary  school enrollment ratio UNESCO database 
HCR Domestic credit to households (in per cent of GDP) EBRD database 
IBR EBRD index of banking sector reform   EBRD database 
INFL Inflation, average consumer prices IMF database 
INV Investment/GDP (in per cent) EBRD database 
INT Interest margin rates between lending and deposit  (in 
per cent)  
Authors’ calculation 
using EBRD database 
LLG Liquid Liabilities (in per cent of GDP) EBRD database 
LR Lending rate (average) EBRD database 
NPL Non-performing loans (in per cent of total loans)   EBRD database 
PCFB Asset share of foreign-owned banks (in per cent) Authors’ calculation 
using EBRD database 
RGDPC Real GDP per capita growth Authors’ calculation 
using EBRD database 
RI Reform index of financial institutional development Authors’ calculation 
using EBRD database 
STMC Stock market capitalisation (in per cent of GDP) EBRD database 
TOP Trade openness to GDP EBRD database 
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Table A2. EBRD indicators of reform 
 
        Indicator EBRD index of banking sector 
reform 
EBRD index of reform of non-
bank financial institutions 
                 Year 
Country 
1996 2007 1996 2007 
Bulgaria 2.0 3.7 2.0 2.7 
Czech.Rep. 4.3 4.3 2.7 3.0 
Estonia 4.0 4.3 2.0 3.7 
Hungary 4.3 4.3 3.0 3.3 
Latvia 4.0 4.3 2.0 3.0 
Lithuania 4.0 4.3 2.0 3.3 
Poland 4.3 4.3 2.7 3.3 
Romania 3.0 4.3 1.0 2.7 
Slovakia 4.3 4.3 3.0 3.3 
Slovenia 4.3 4.3 2.0 2.7 
         Source EBRD 
Table A3 : Interest rate margin (%) 
               Year 
Country 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Bulgaria 8.4 8.2 6.6 5.9 5.8 4.9 4.9 6.3
Czech.Rep 3.8 6.1 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.5 4.3 4.6
Estonia 2.1 5.6 2.9 2.7 4.1 6.2 3.6 4.1
Hungary 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.5 1.9 2.2 1.8 2
Latvia 7.7 5.5 2.3 2.4 4 2.7 3.7 4.8
Lithuania 9.7 7.4 5.8 4.8 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.3
Poland 7.2 8.8 7.4 6.7 7.4 4.2 4.1 4.5
Romania 20.8 19.5 16.2 14.4 14.1 13.2 9.2 6.7
Slovakia 4.5 5 3.6 3.2 5 4.3 4.1 4.2
Slovenia 5.7 5.3 5 4.8 4.9 4.6 4.6 2.3
Source: EBRD 
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Table A4:      Mortgage lending (as a percentage of GDP) 
Year 
Country 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Bulgaria - - - 1.2 2.7 4.8 7.2 10.4 
Czech.Rep 2.0 2.4 3.0 4.2 5.9 7.7 10.0 12.5 
Estonia 2.3 3.5 5.5 9.5 14.6 22.6 33.0 37.7 
Hungary 1.1 1.7 4.1 8.0 9.5 11.5 13.9 16.4 
Latvia 1.6 2.4 4.1 7.6 12.4 19.5 28.9 33.7 
Lithuania - - 1.9 3.4 5.5 9.0 12.6 17.2 
Poland - - 2.4 3.4 3.8 5.0 7.2 9.9 
Romania - - - 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.4 
Slovakia 0.1 0.4 1.0 2.2 2.9 3.6 4.1 4.5 
Slovenia 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.8 4.2 4.5 6.2 
 
 
Table A5: Levin-Lin-Chu stationarity test  
Series 
Coefficient t-value t-star P > t Level 
 
BCPS -0.54670 -7.485 -4.53383 0.0000 I(0) 
DCPS -0.24590 -5.356 -2.25883 0.0119 I(0) 
GDPC -0.15040 -5.358 -3.71969 0.0001 I(0) 
GVE -0.52960 -7.119 -4.00032 0.0000 I(0) 
HC  -0.25120 -6.727 -4.99531 0.0000 I(0) 
HCR -0.14939 -3.812 -1.71353 0.0433 I(0) 
IBR -0.47511 -7.459 -4.42017 0.0000 I(0) 
INFL -0.46330 -6.384 -2.61235 0.0045 I(0) 
INT -0.63380 -8.358 -5.17992 0.0000 I(0) 
INV -0.19084 -3.633 -1.26133 0.0136 I(0) 
LLG -0.19990 -5.282 -3.15713 0.0008 I(0) 
LR -0.65490 -8.049 -4.40804 0.0000 I(0) 
NPL -0.21493 -3.994 -1.29016 0.0985 I(0) 
PCFB -0.55450 -9.596 -7.97387 0.0000 I(0) 
RGDPC -0.58719 -8.584 -5.15507 0.0000 I(0) 
RI -0.43460 -8.835 -5.78175 0.0000 I(0) 
STMC -0.89160 15.682 -13.67317 0.0000 I(0) 
TOP -0.28015 -8.240 -6.20488 0.0000 I(0) 
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The Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) test 
The LLC test is based on estimating the following equation: 
titiitiiti yty ,1,, ςρθδα ++++=Δ −   i = 1,2,…N, t = 1,2,…T 
This model allows for two–way fixed effects (α and θ) and unit–specific time trends. Because the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is restricted to be homogeneous across all units of 
the panel, the unit–specific fixed effects are an important source of heterogeneity. The test 
involves the null hypothesis H0 : ρi = 0 for all i against the alternative HA : ρi = ρ < 0, with 
auxiliary assumptions about the coefficients of the deterministic components also being required 
under the null. The LLC test assumes that the individual processes are cross–sectionally 
independent. Given this assumption, conditions (and correction factors) are derived under which 
the pooled OLS estimate of ρ will have a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis. 
Levin et al. (2002) analyse the asymptotic distribution of this pooled panel estimate of ρ under 
different assumptions on the existence of fixed effects and homogeneous time trends. This test 
can be viewed as a pooled Dickey–Fuller (or ADF) test, potentially with differing lag lengths 
across the units of the panel.  
 
The Pesaran (2007) test 
The Pesaran (2007) test is based on estimating the following equation: 
tijti
j
jitiiti yyy
i
,,
1
,1,, εβρα
ρ
+Δ++=Δ −
=
− ∑    i = 1,2,…N, t = 1,2,…T 
It is essentially a t-test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels with cross-sectional dependence. 
Similarly to the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003) test, it is based on the mean of individual DF 
(or ADF) t-statistics of each unit in the panel. The null hypothesis is that all series are non-
stationary. To eliminate cross-sectional dependence, the standard DF (or ADF) regressions are 
augmented with the cross-sectional averages of lagged levels and first-differences of the 
individual series (CADF statistics). This avoids size distortions, especially in the case of models 
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with residual serial correlations and linear trends. When T is fixed, in order to ensure that the 
CADF statistics do not depend on the nuisance parameters the effect of the initial cross-sectional 
mean must also be eliminated; this can be achieved by applying the test to the deviations of the 
variable from the cross-sectional mean. Lags of the dependent variable can be introduced to 
control for serial correlation in the errors. The order of augmentation can be estimated using 
model selection criteria such as Akaike or Schwartz applied as usual to the underlying time 
series specification. 
The exact critical values of the t-bar statistic are given by Pesaran (2007). The Z[t-bar] statistic  
is distributed standard normal under the null hypothesis of nonstationarity. Pesaran (2007) 
suggests that a generalisation of the test to unbalanced panels can be made straightforwardly as 
IPS (2003) show. In the case of unbalanced panels only standardised Z[t-bar] statistics can be 
computed. 
 
 
